Inspired by the historical English experience, we modify the Beckerian paradigm of fertility by incorporating costly, societal influence on contraception. Heterogeneous, generationallylinked households choose between "traditional" and "modern" contraception. The modern has a higher fixed but lower variable cost of averting childbirths. Initially the rich adopt the modern, which unleashes society-wide diffusion. Eventually everyone switches, lowering fertility further and across households. Hastening the switch is falling child mortality.
The Victorian period represents a major turning point in the population history of England.
Three profound and unrelenting demographic transformations originate in this period. First came the mortality transition: life expectancy at birth rose from near 40 by 1830 to 50 by 1900.
Much of this progress touched the lives of children: a newborn during 1861-70 had a 27.9% chance of dying before reaching age five, by 1911-20 only 16.5%. The fertility transition followed. Marriages in 1860, when they lasted twenty years or more, produced on average 6.16 births; by 1915, that number had declined to 2.43. Accompanying these radical transitions was the third, a somewhat overlooked revolution in family-size limitation -a contraception revolution -a new paradigm of conscious prevention (via natural or artificial means) of unwanted pregnancies subsequent to reaching parity (family-size target). There is indirect evidence of such birth control: 32.9% of women born during 1840-69 had two or fewer children (live births) ever, compared to 57.5% of women born during 1870-99 (Hinde, 2003 , Table 13 .2). 1 We propose a theory where these demographic transformations become causally entwined: the mortality transition triggers the contraception revolution, which in turn, makes the fertility transition possible. In our story, one or more factors lower desired fertility of couples, be it rising adult wages that raise the opportunity cost of childbearing or declining child mortality that creates too many surviving children. All else the same, the natural process of procreation, if unrestricted, would likely overshoot whatever the parity may be. For couples, this is not much of a concern as long as child mortality is high and the number of surviving children is close to target. But if child mortality declines precipitously, as it did in England, couples have no choice but to adopt some method of birth control so as to stay on target. Depending on cost considerations -some social, others informational -that may mean switching from less to more effective contraception in a conscious effort to reduce fertility. It is this line of argument that places the contraception revolution firmly at the centre of our story and in between the mortality and the (subsequent) fertility transitions.
Placing the contraception revolution centre stage does a whole lot more. Economists have long sought to explain the emergence and persistence of the fertility transition. Their search for a single explanation, a single trigger, has led them to doubt the role of the mortality transition and negate the contribution of the contraception transition (Galor, 2012) . 2 Indeed, the dominant (Beckerian) paradigm of fertility views the contraception revolution as a side show, a mere 1 While change in nuptiality, the proportion of women marrying, was a proximate determinant of fertility until the eighteenth century, it had little explanatory power for the nineteenth century fertility decline. Similarly, changes in the distribution of age at marriage were too minor to play much of a role. 2 For Becker (1960) , rapid industrialisation and urbanisation circa mid-nineteenth century generated strong wage and income growth which raised the opportunity time-cost of children and induced households to shift from quantity to quality of children. For others, the acceleration in the rate of technological progress during this period increased the returns to human capital and quality investment in fewer children (see Galor, 2005 Galor, , 2012 , for an overview of this research).
reflection of changes in the demand for children: in that paradigm, couples perform a simple cost-benefit analysis to compute their fertility target and achieve it at no cost (Becker, 1960) . 3 But more importantly, the Beckerian paradigm implicitly assumes couples' fertility decisions are impervious to social influences of any kind. As we discuss in Section 2, such an assumption is limiting: late nineteenth century England saw significant institutional resistance -from the clergy and the medical profession -to the practice of marital fertility control making a couple's goal of attaining their fertility target costly and subject to social influence. Additionally, there is evidence these costs abated over time as information about and access to fertility control became available and the very notion and possibility of fertility regulation became increasingly acceptable. Positioning contraception at the centre of the historical fertility transition offers us one possible way to model these social influences on fertility and to study if their inclusion amplifies the potency of an existing trigger, be it wage growth or mortality declines, enough to elevate its status to the explanation.
In our model, the household's Beckerian cost-benefit analysis of fertility is expanded to include social influences on fertility as well as the cost of achieving that fertility via specific contraception strategies. Specifically, the biological process, left unhindered, will produce children in conformity with "natural fertility" whatever may be the true demand for children. If fewer children are desired, this process has to be restrained through contraception, with associated costs and benefits. We show that for a given contraception strategy, an exogenous decline in child mortality causes a decline in both childbirths (total fertility, TFR) and surviving children (net fertility, NFR). The latter is true only when income crosses a threshold, and once that happens, families start to make investments in the quality of their offspring. This is important for the following reason. A key pillar of historical demographic transitions is that declines in TFR and NFR often followed declines in child mortality. Simple versions of the Becker model, with homothetic preferences, have trouble delivering this link. This has been noted by Doepke (2005) and more recently Galor (2012) . In fact Galor (2012) uses it to pass an indictment against such a causal link. Our model is able to deliver this link since costly fertility control in our setup gives rise to non-homothetic preferences over the number of children. 4 In the dynamic version of our model, we allow for persistent intra-and inter-generational 3 Becker (1991) writes standard economic theories 'appear sufficient to explain major declines in fertility, and simple and sufficiently effective birth control methods have been available to produce these declines' (p.141). We argue such a view is at odds with important ground realities of the English transitions. First, while it is true 'simple and sufficiently effective birth control methods' had been known for centuries in England and elsewhere, information about how they worked was not widely available nor always precise. Second, that illegitimate fertility fell in conjunction with marital fertility during England's transition indicates the means to achieve fertility targets changed (Knodel and van de Walle, 1986 ). 4 It bears mention that our link is conceptually very different from the same obtained via a precautionarydemand-for-children channel -one that arises because of uncertainty regarding the number of child survivors -explored in Kalemli-Ozcan (2008) .
income heterogeneity across households so as to capture cross-sectional differences in fertility behaviour before, during and after the English transition (Clark, 2005) . We also permit households to choose between two birth control strategies: a traditional method (abstinence, prolonging breast feeding) and a more efficient, modern one (coitus interruptus, sheaths and appliances). 5 Associated with each strategy are costs: while the modern comes with a higher fixed cost (social opposition, informational barriers), it has a lower variable cost (it is more effective) when it comes to averting childbirths. This means, all else the same, if desired fertility is much less than natural fertility, households would prefer the modern method because of the lower variable cost. When child mortality is high, nature anyway leaves few survivors. In that environment, couples prefer the traditional method because it delivers the desired number of surviving children at a lower fixed cost; the variable cost margin is not that important. A precipitous, exogenous decline in child mortality, however, changes the calculus by deviating surviving fertility under the traditional method away from desired surviving fertility. When that deviation is large enough, households are induced to pay the higher fixed cost and switch from the traditional to the modern method so as to take advantage of the lower variable cost. The initial "switchers" are the rich, those unfazed by the higher fixed cost: after all, the rich enjoy a higher total utility which means they are less affected by increases in marginal disutility due to social opprobrium. Eventually everyone switches. Hastening the switch are the decline in child mortality 6 and a social diffusion process (Munshi and Myaux, 2006 ) that lowers the fixed cost of the modern technology over time.
While child mortality triggers the fertility transition in our model, our theory is more general. It can include other catalysts such as income growth that, over time, take the economy from a Malthusian to a post-Malthusian to a modern equilibrium. Along the way, the crosssectional correlation between household income and fertility goes from being positive to negative. The lower demand for children, from the post-Malthusian phase onwards, means a latent demand for fertility regulation which households are able to act upon once income crosses a threshold and/or child mortality rates fall. In other words, income growth alone can generate contraception and fertility transitions in our model.
Quantitative experiments suggest ways in which our story is in line with the English fertil- 5 Our decision to lump coitus interruptus -the withdrawal method -with modern, appliance-based methods, may appear strange. Data limitations, discussed in Section 5, govern this decision, partly. Perhaps more importantly, Victorian England was characterised by a "general state of profound public ignorance on matters of basic sexual functioning and anatomy...even among trained doctors" (Garrett et al., 2001 ). This suggests information costs associated with coitus interruptus were significant. In Section 1, we also discuss societal opposition to it. The implication is that while coitus interruptus was vaguely known of and even practiced on occasion before 1850, it took a contraception revolution to get people to practice it as part of a deliberate, informed strategy to curb childbearing. 6 The switch is not essential to why the mortality transition matters for the (net) fertility transition. For the latter, it is sufficient that contraception is costly. The switch simply gives added momentum to the fertility transition. England's mortality and fertility transitions.
Beyond the relevance of our work for historical, and possibly modern, transitions (see Section 6), this paper makes several theoretical contributions. It shows that costly contraception in the Becker model can generate a link from child mortality to total and net fertility rates without relying on uncertainty regarding child survival. It also shows how pre-transition economies are characterised by a positive cross-sectional correlation between household income and fertility, a correlation that turns negative during the transition as wealthier households invest more in child quality and adopt costlier but more efficient methods of contraception.
Some facts about the English transition are outlined in Section 1 below. Section 2 specifies a dynastic model where households care about the quantity and quality of children and face costly fertility regulation. The static and dynamic equilibria are analysed in Section 3. Section 4 specifies the process of diffusion by which households switch to a more efficient contraception technology. Section 5 parameterises the model and shows that the predicted fertility transition broadly fits the time-series of the English transition. Section 6 discusses the applicability of the model to more recent transitions while Section 7 concludes.
The Fertility Transition in England & Wales
In his tome, The Demographic Transition, Chesnais (1992) lays out three central propositions that capture major demographic transitions: (i) the chronological sequence of the transition, mortality decline, followed by fertility decline 7 , (ii) a general restriction of marriages followed by a limitation of births, and (iii) the context of modernisation -the overarching trends in societies evolving from traditional, agrarian to modern, urban forms -and their effect on the onset of fertility decline. The English demographic transition, as we describe below, fits these propositions reasonably well. Figure 1 illustrates the transitions in mortality and fertility. The measure of mortality used in the figure is child mortality rate (CMR), the probability of death between ages 0-5, data for which goes back only to 1841. As the upper panel shows, CMR remained high until the 1860s, after which it started to fall steeply. 8 This was part of a broader progress in mortality that was confined to those between the ages of one and forty: mortality in these age groups fell by nearly 50% in the 1890s compared to their levels in the 1830s. Immunisation against small pox and other diseases, improvements in sanitation and public health, all played significant roles in this mortality decline. This account of English mortality is largely agreed upon by demographers who use it to place the onset of the child mortality transition somewhere in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.
The English Mortality and Fertility Declines
The onset of England and Wales', indeed much of Europe's, fertility transition has been dated by demographers to somewhere in the 1870s (Figure 1 ) or a bit later (Chesnais, 1992 , Table 4 .3).
The decline in the total fertility rate that we see in the upper panel of Figure 1 was accompanied by a decline in net fertility (lower panel). Fertility did decline earlier in the nineteenth century, between 1811-20 and 1846, but then remained steady for three decades until the 1870s when it started on its path of precipitous and consistent decline. The principal driver of that earlier decline was nuptiality, changes in the age and incidence of marriage. This last fact has been emphasised both by Clark (2008; Ch. 4) and Voigtländer and Voth (2013) : by some counts, more than half of "all possible births" in pre-1800 Europe -before marital fertility limitation emerged -were averted because women married late or never married.
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Consistent with Chesnais's second proposition, the English fertility transition represented a 8 Hinde (2003, p. 195) , using a different yardstick, life expectancy at birth, for which longer time series are available, argues that the English mortality transition went through three phases: there was a 'definite, though rather modest' decline during 1780-1830, followed by stagnation during the mid nineteenth century, and finally, a second 'decisive' period of decline starting in the 1860s. pleted fertility between women born in the middle of the nineteenth century and women born at the end of that century can be attributed to changes in nuptiality.' This suggests the extensive margin of fertility was not that important which, in turn, justifies the singular focus of this paper on the intensive margin.
shift in fertility behaviour from the extensive margin (nuptiality) to the intensive margin (fertility regulation within marriage), a transition from 'natural' fertility to controlled fertility. Fertility limitation now depended on the number of children a couple already had, reflecting a conscious choice and ability to restrict family size. Average completed family size of ever-married women fell from over 7 for birth cohorts 1826-31 to about 4 for cohorts 1891-96 (Hinde, 2003) .
32% of women born in 1840-69 had completed family size of fewer than three children (live births), compared to roughly 56% of women born in 1870-99, suggesting some sort of deliberate family limitation was being pursued. Reher (1999) What of Chesnais's first proposition? Chesnais makes a prima facie case that mortality declines in portions of western Europe preceded fertility declines by at least a century, the implication being the mortality decline had little to do with the fertility decline. However, after accounting for data limitations, wide variability in declines, and exceptions such as France, Chesnais comes to the tempered conclusion that declines in mortality 'seem to be necessary' for the fertility transition but 'hardly sufficient' (p. 149).
For our purpose, it is of some importance that the mortality decline preceded and hence, could have instigated, the subsequent fertility decline. The exact length of the delay is of secondary concern because, in the case of England & Wales, marital fertility regulation followed soon after the mortality transition in the late nineteenth century (see Table 1 A major hurdle to the democratisation of birth control in English society was the deepseated resistance from the medical profession and, less surprisingly, the clergy. A former prime minister's public advocacy of doctors providing guidance on family limitation was widely condemned by the medical press. The medical community labeled birth control as folk medicine practiced by quacks and midwives. As late as 1901, an editorial in the British Medical Journal labelled it as 'unnatural and degrading...and oft injurious to both husband and wife' (Soloway, 1982) .
Even advocates of birth control spoke out against the ill effects of coitus interruptus. George Drysdale, the founder of the Malthusian League in the 1860s, declared it physically injurious and the cause of 'nervous disorders'; Margaret Sanger was of the view that it caused 'neurological damage' to women; Marie Stopes opined that the 'male secretion' had a beneficial effect on women's health. Religious authorities, both Protestant (Anglican) and Catholic, reinforced these notions. Their attitude changed after 1851, 'from toleration of the wife whose husband employed coitus interruptus to condemnation of any form of wifely cooperation' (Santow, 1995) .
Opposition to contraception in any form was relaxed only in 1930 when the Anglican Church first adopted a more accommodating stance (Fisher, 2006) .
How important was coitus interruptus in the fertility transition? Santow (1995) is of the opinion that it was essential to fertility transitions in perhaps all Western countries. In the pretransition phase, since few would willingly deviate from natural and completed intercourse, fertility was close to natural levels (Aries, 1980; Clark, 2008) . Even so, some attempt was being made to stop or space births better using such methods as prolonged lactation and elimination of postpartum coitus. These methods received widespread approval from medical practitioners at the time. Abortion, despite substantial risk to the mother, was probably always practised to some extent, as were some herbal preparations taken by mouth (Santow, 1995) . Coitus interruptus was definitely practised but a desire to limit fertility may not have been the reason for its use, especially since the physiology of reproduction was not well understood. 10 In our view, at some point all this changed. Prompted by income growth and mortality declines, smaller families became imperative. Ordinary people started to demand more information on the process of procreation which led to a renewed attention on fertility control, and coitus interruptus in particular. Charles Knowlton's book gained popularity many years after its initial publication when the need to regulate fertility arose. There was a clear break with the past and the clamour for information on birth control was impossible to ignore because the issues were being discussed publicly, in meetings, newspapers, pamphlets. Tremendous resistance from both clergy and medical practitioners ensued: by now, they understood the basic biology of procreation and were outraged that methods such as coitus interruptus were quite effective in averting conception.
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How is any of this pertinent to our analysis below? In the quantitative exercises reported in Section 6, we characterise coitus interruptus as a 'modern method' of contraception and lump it together with the appliance-based methods. It is our contention that coitus interruptus is best viewed as modern not because it did not exist in pre-transition times but because its use then may not have been part of an informed, deliberate strategy to control marital fertility. That 10 Santow (1995) mentions the notion that semen poisons a mother's milk was widely believed to be true and may explain the limited use of coitus interruptus in the pre-transition. There was condemnation of the method as well, some of it due to the long-held view that coitus interruptus robbed the woman of a chance to reach orgasm which was believed to be necessary for impregnation. Once again, we see evidence of a confused understanding of human reproduction. 11 Garrett et al.'s (2001) The upshot is, in an era defined by insufficient information and weak understanding of the biology of procreation as well as medical, religious and political resistance to the idea of birth control, the cost of practicing family limitation in late nineteenth century England was high:
as we see below, that cost was changing over time. At the end of the day, there is evidence that in most regions of England, marital fertility was lowered through 'stopping' behaviour, and that this was primarily achieved through more frequent abstinence and deliberate use of coitus interruptus. The latter was particularly responsible for the sharp reductions in working class fertility achieved during 1880-1910, the heydays of the fertility transition (McLaren, 1991). 13 
Diffusion
The English fertility decline broadly followed socioeconomic lines with the fertility differential across social and occupational categories widening in the early days of the transition. They introduced foresight and organisation where formerly there had been only automatic, unplanned behaviour and resigned surrender to impulses and destiny. This extraordinary change transformed the creation of life and the sexual act..' (Aries, 1980) 13 Contraceptive devices were not popular initially. Condoms and spermicides were not widely available. Certain methods like the rhythm method were unavailable as the precise timing of ovulation was not known. For working classes, contraceptives were expensive items. Secondly, ignorance and unreliable promises made by the penny press made people more skeptical of these devices. Many women perceived them to be physically harmful, a perception aggravated by medical advice. Indeed many doctors felt it was their duty to prevent the spread of contraceptive knowledge and devices. Condoms were associated in the popular mind with prostitution and the prevention of STDs (Seccombe, 1990) . Considerable advancements in reproductive technology happened at the start of the twentieth century. By the 1920s, caps and diaphragms started to become widely available in birth control clinics. Then came spermicidal pessaries, sheaths, and finally, by early 1930s, the latex condom. Where social learning, the diffusion of knowledge about birth control, played a role was within some socio-economic groups. In her review of Marie Stopes' correspondence with workingclass women soliciting birth control information, Seccombe (1990) offers convincing evidence of this. Working-class women acquired knowledge of contraceptives through word of mouth.
The main hurdles were not so much a stigma against discussing these as ignorance about contraception and a taboo against the use of artificial means to restrict fertility within marriage.
Many of Stopes' correspondents were fearful of the side effects of contraception in general and preventatives in particular while others were unsure where to find contraceptives since they
were not yet sold over the counter in local shops.
The Model
Demographers classify theories of the fertility transition in two categories, innovation-based The theory we propose is an amalgam of the innovation and adjustment hypotheses. Diffusion of the notion of fertility control alone cannot explain the onset of the English transition. That fertility started falling across all socio-economic groups from the 1870s -groups with very different birth-control adoption rates -suggests an underlying common cause that necessitated smaller families. In our model, declining child mortality across all income groups is that common cause, one which lowers the demand for children and motivates the need for an adjustment in fertility objectives. Initially-available birth control methods are not as effective in achieving those objectives and adoption of more effective methods involves hefty switching costs. Richer households are the first to respond: they reduce family size by switching to more efficient forms of birth control, despite the high cost. These costs fall over time as information about modern methods becomes widely available and social opposition to their use in marital fertility regulation abates. As child mortality and fertility limitation costs keep falling, effective fertility control becomes imperative for more and more households.
We start by developing the basic model for a given birth control technology, with social diffusion shut down (until we reach Section 4). The starting point of our model is the eve of the fertility transition: the social innovation discussed above has already happened, that is, family limitation is firmly in the fertility consciousness of agents and traditional forms of birth control are in use. Child mortality, the common cause, the adjustment, is about to sharply decline.
Basics
Consider a single-good economy consisting of an infinite sequence of three period-lived overlapping generations of agents. The three stages of life are childhood, adulthood and old age.
At each date t = 1, 2, .., 1, a continuum of agents (children) with mass n t is born to existing
adults. An exogenous fraction, ¡ t , of them survive to adulthood. Henceforth, ¡ will be dubbed the child survival rate and 1°¡ the child mortality rate. We implicitly assume ¡ is revealed early in childhood, before parental investments are made. Anyone who survives to adulthood is assumed to survive till the end of old age.
Adults are endowed with one unit of time which is allocated to work and raising children; everyone retires in old age. In childhood, agents are passive; they simply acquire human capital paid for by their parents. As young adults, they become active decision-makers: they work, determine their family size and strategies to achieve that, spend time and resources raising children, invest in their children's schooling, consume, and save for old age in the form of physical capital. Everyone consumes all wealth before dying.
The single good is produced from physical (K ) and human (H ) capital using the technology
and g ∏ 0 is the fixed rate of exogenous TFP growth. Physical capital depreciates 100% upon use. Assuming competitive factor markets, the equilibrium wage (w t ) per efficiency unit of labor and the rental rate°Ω t ¢ for capital are, respectively, given by
where
Adults differ in their labor productivity: they are heterogeneous on a single, innate, unobserved dimension which, for convenience, we call ability. Ability " is drawn identically and independently across adults (and across generations) from a density function g (") with asso- units of goods in her education, similar to Moav (2005) , her human capital as an adult (at the beginning of t ), q t , is given by
This human capital, combined with her ability, generates labor market income. For a child born at t°1 whose ability " i is realised as an adult at t , "full income" in period t is given by v i t ¥ " i q t w t of which the part involving q is in her parent's control. For future use, denote the CDF of v t by z t (v t ), generated by the underlying ability distribution G and household optimisation. If g > 0, TFP grows over time causing w t to grow, which in turn, causes v i t to trend. Until further notice, we set g = 0 and A t = A 8t .
Contraception Technology
As noted before, demand-side models in the Beckerian tradition assume households' desired fertility can be costlessly implemented and without regard to social influences. Departing from this tradition, we model family limitation as a conscious albeit costly attempt to control fertility (Michael and Willis, 1976; Easterlin, 1975) , one susceptible to social pulls. In our setup, the household's Beckerian trade-offs are adjusted further to respect the cost of achieving its fertility target. Our formulation is related to Easterlin (1975) and Easterlin et al.'s (1980) synthesis model of fertility wherein a household faces costly fertility regulation and a child production function ("supply" of births). 15 Unlike us, Easterlin treats the availability and use of contraception methods as exogenous, and does not consider the transition from 'natural' to controlled fertility as the consequence of income growth, mortality decline and ensuing social change.
The details are as follows. Left unfettered, the biological process of procreation is assumed to produce ¥ children in any household. Here ¥ corresponds to natural fecundity which depends on biological factors. We take this to be exogenous as our focus is on the intensive margin of fertility regulation. If a household wishes to attain a fertility level lower than ¥, the biological process has to be subjected to active birth control through the adoption of a contraception strategy. 16 We distinguish between two contraception strategies: a readily-available, traditional strategy and a more efficient, modern one. Associated with each strategy are costs that, for convenience, take the form of utility loss alone. 17 While some strategies are costly in terms of diminished sexual satisfaction or lack of spontaneity, others bring about real or imagined decreases in physical health, require sacrifice of religious principles, or involve an embarrassing search for reliable information about their implementation and availability. A word about abortion is in order here. In our view, a contraception strategy is supposed to prevent conception; its job is 15 Baudin (2010) also views interaction between the economic and cultural determinants of fertility as being central to the onset of the fertility transition. As in the synthesis models of Easterlin, culture influences fertility choices because it shapes preferences: being part of a cultural group means adopting the fertility norm of that group. 16 Strulik (2014) takes an alternative approach by assuming households care specifically about sexual intercourse besides the number of surviving children. In his model contraceptives are used after income crosses a threshold. As we discussed earlier, since contraceptives were not widely used in eighteenth and early nineteenth century England, a more general model of birth control and its associated social cost is needed to understand the English transition. 17 The Lewis-Faning survey found only 1.4% of the non-appliance method users referred to the monetary cost of appliance methods as being the chief deterrent to their use. (Fisher, 2006; p. 143) not to prevent pregnancies from coming to fruition (which is what abortion achieves). As such, abortion is not a contraception strategy and cannot be chosen ex ante. 18 Let j 2 {1, 2} denote contraception strategies where the first strategy (technology) is identified with the traditional method, the second with the modern method. Let AE j ∏ 0 be a fixed cost and let ∏ j denote the ineffectiveness of a contraception strategy; assume ∏ 1 > ∏ 2 . In Section 4, we specify how the fixed cost°AE j ¢ depends on social influence. For now, it is enough to note that AE 2 > AE 1 in a society on the cusp of fertility regulation. The utility cost of contraception method j is given as°j
a decreasing and convex function of childbirth. 19 For a given technology, as the need for lower n rises, the variable cost of having to avert ¥°n births also rises at an increasing rate. Notice this variable cost is influenced by ∏ : the lower is ∏, the more effective is the technology at preventing conception, and hence the lower is the variable cost of adopting the technology. In particular, if ∏ 2 = 0 (as is assumed in Section 5), the only cost associated with the modern technology is the fixed cost. More generally, from (3), we have°2
implying technology 2 is more effective (has lower variable cost) at averting births than technology 1 but comes with a higher initial fixed cost. For example, in Figure 2 ,°2 (n) and°1 (n) are shown to cross; the former is higher at ¥ and the latter is higher at some n 0 . These differences underlie some of the results we obtain later. While the initial adopters of the modern technology are the rich -those unperturbed by the associated higher fixed cost, AE 2 -eventually everyone switches to the modern technology so as to economise on the variable cost. 18 We leave out any discussion of abortion in the ensuing analysis. First off, the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 outlawed abortion. Second, while many authors believe the use of abortion was common especially among the working classes, there is little concrete evidence on the matter. There is some evidence that the cost (psychic) was lowered by aborting in first trimester but the inherent danger and legal consequences kept the cost still high. 19 A somewhat imprecise microfoundation of°j (n) can be provided. Let e j denote how faithfully the adult employs strategy j and let the utility cost of adopting contraceptive strategy j be°j = AE j + e 2 j . Assume, contraception strategy j is associated with the child production function
Clearly, h j (0) = ¥ and @h j (e)/@e < 0; also @h j (e)/@e, the marginal efficiency of contraception method j , depends on ∏ j . Using n = h(e j ) and solving for e to substitute into°j yields (3). This microfoundation, of course, does not permit ∏ j ! 0.
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With a slight abuse of notation, henceforth, the utility cost of restricting fertility using contraception strategy j will be denoted°j (n), an increasing and convex function of the number of births avoided through contraception.
Preferences
Adult households view children as consumption goods and derive direct utility from the number of surviving children, ¡ t n t . Parents are imperfectly altruistic, receiving a warm-glow from the average human capital (earning potential), ¡ t n t q t +1 , of their surviving children. Parents make their investment subsequent to child survival and care only about the expected human capital of the child, that is, they ignore uncertainty with respect to child ability. In addition, they care about their own consumption in adulthood and old-age, denoted by c 1t and c 2t +1
respectively. An adult agent-household i at date t employing contraceptive method j derives utility
where u and X are strictly increasing and strictly concave functions, Ø 2 (0, 1) is the discount factor and º 2 {0, 1} is an indicator function. When º = 0, only the well-known Beckerian calculus is operative and achieving desired fertility is costless. When º = 1, the household's fertility is the outcome of a birth-control technology. The household can, with certainty, have any number°n < ¥ ¢ of children it desires but now, besides quantity-quality concerns, it must take into account the cost of achieving its desired fertility. 20 Assuming logarithmic functions we reformulate (4) as
where Three points bear emphasis here. First, one must not think of the Beckerian calculus as, in some sense, preceding the contraception calculus. In the model, the contraception calculus is omnipresent; households do not face a choice between adoption and non-adoption of contraception. In Section 4 below, they will entertain the possibility of switching from traditional 20 In this setup, with continuous fertility, birth control implies stopping not spacing behaviour: households use birth control to stop future births once desired family size is reached, not to space births better.
forms of birth control to modern ones. Second, rejecting the contraception calculus unfailingly implies n = ¥. Of course it is possible that families choose n = ¥, in effect behaving "as if" they had not adopted contraception. We rule this out via Assumption 1(d) below. Third, our formulation of contraception costs ostensibly appears similar to a quadratic norm over fertility, that is the cost of deviating one's fertility choice from the social norm, captured by some averagē n, is (n°n) 2 . But, typically, such formulations rely on births not survivors. For us the relevant deviation is ¥°n, births averted from a state of natural fertility. An earlier work, Bhattacharya and Chakraborty (2012), implies that in order for social norms and child mortality to matter for net fertility, it is not sufficient to have non-homothetic preferences: social norms have to be defined with respect to childbirths instead of surviving children. The present paper may be viewed as building on that idea but differs fundamentally in that social influence matters only through the cost of modern contraception, not family-size norm.
The Household's Problem
For now, abstract from ability heterogeneity and the choice between alternative contraception strategies and, as such, suppress the i and j superscripts. Assume everyone has already adopted the natural method of contraception. Each adult household allocates its time endowment between market activity -which brings in income v t for each unit of labor time -and child rearing. 
subject to the budget constraints
equations (2) and (3) and the additional constraints
Note that costs of child rearing and direct utility from children depend on the number of surviving children, hence on ¡. In contrast, the cost of contraception is independent of ¡ since it depends on the number of childbirths. Evidently, the quadratic form for°(n) renders the lifetime utility function (6) non-homogenous and non-homothetic. This will play a role -see
Online Appendix A -in generating the non-monotonic income-expansion paths in Section 4.
Logarithmic preferences imply that non-negativity constraints for consumption (hence, saving) and fertility will not bind in equilibrium. 21 The household may, however, choose to have ¥ children (n = ¥) or not invest in child quality (x = 0). In our setup, parents receive warm glow from educating their children and, hence, are not fully altruistic in the sense of Cordoba and Ripoll (2014). Our formulation, by its very nature, avoids the issues relating to the nonnegativity constraint on bequests that occupy their focus.
Denoting the Langrange multipliers associated with n t ∑ ¥ and x t ∏ 0 by & n ∏ 0 and & x ∏ 0 respectively, the necessary first order conditions for optima are:
for s t , n t and x t respectively. We introduce a few parameter restrictions.
Part (a) ensures that income is high enough to afford children. Below we show it also guarantees a tradeoff between c 1t and n t . Since the budget constraint can turn non-convex in the presence of both child quality and quantity, part (b) is sufficient to ensure second order conditions hold (see Online Appendix B for details). Such a parameter restriction is, by now, standard in quantity-quality models of fertility. Part (d) implies the child survival rate corresponding to natural fecundity°n = ¥ ¢ is ¡ min . By restricting ¡ t 2°¡ min ,1 § , we ensure n stays below ¥. 22 The importance of part (c) is clarified later.
21 Baudin et al. (2015) study the phenomenon of voluntary childlessness -corresponding to n = 0 in our framework -in an unified model of marriage and fertility. 22 For interior x, it follows from (11) that ∞ae(1°µ)c 1t = ¡n t (1 + x t ) implying n = 0, the other corner, is not a possible optimum.
Fertility Regimes
For the household's decision problem specified above, we first characterise properties of the fertility equilibrium at any given date t where x t > 0, then proceed to analyse settings in which parents do not invest in child quality. A regime with x t > 0 is labeled Modern, while that without child quality investment (x t = 0) is termed Malthusian. 23 
Modern Regime
Such a regime is characterised by x t > 0 and n t < ¥. It applies to a point in time at which the fertility transition is already under way, people are actively limiting births and investing in the quality of their surviving children. Setting º = 1 and & n = 0 = & x in the first order conditions (10)- (11), and after some rearrangement, we arrive at an equation that implicitly solves for the household's fertility choice,
where √ is as defined in Assumption 1(d), and the time-subscript on ¡ has been dropped for the present. At first glance, the effects of child mortality and contraception effectiveness become 
where¥ ¥ ¡¥. Surviving fertility falls with ¡ when n is below ¥/2 which, in turn, obtains for income levels satisfying
where ' ¥ 2∞[µ°ae(1°µ)] + ∏/2. The threshold,ṽ(¡), itself is decreasing in ¡. Thus, an increase 23 We call it so because, in the absence of child quality investment, child quantity is the sole focus of the household's fertility calculus. In Section 5, we introduce exogenous TFP growth, g . In that setting, what we term "Malthusian" corresponds more to the "post-Malthusian Regime" in Galor (2012) .
in ¡ makes it more likely that z falls with ¡: households previously at full-incomeṽ would now find themselves above it. Since we have established that fertility falls with ¡, this means at low income levels (v t <ṽ) fertility falls less than proportionately when more children survive. 24 Proposition 1 summarises this discussion and identifies several additional shifters of household fertility; its proof is in Online Appendix C.
PROPOSITION 1. In a Modern Regime -one with quality investment in children -household fertility, n, is computed as the unique solution to eqn. (12). n is decreasing in full income (v), child rearing costs (ø, ±) and the child survival rate (¡), but increasing in the ineffectiveness of the contraception method (∏). The effect of the child survival probability°¡ ¢ on the number of surviving children (z) depends on household full income: z rises with ¡ for v <ṽ(¡) and falls for v >ṽ(¡) whereṽ(¡) is defined in (14).
Next, turn to the consumption-fertility tradeoff. From (8) and (9), it follows s t = Øc 1t which converts (7) into (1 + Ø)c 1t = v t (1°ø¡n t )°±¡n t°¡ n t x t . For interior x, using (11) in the last equation, it is easy to check that √c 1t = v t°( øv t + ±°1)¡n t . Assumption 1(a) guarantees a tradeoff between c 1t and ¡n t ; we have more to say on this below.
Finally, the child quantity-quality tradeoff. Given the optimum level of fertility from equation (12), child quality investment is given by
Clearly, investment in child quality and surviving fertility move in opposite directions. In conjunction with Proposition 1, this implies reductions in child mortality lead to an increase in parental investment in child quality and richer parents invest more in their children than poorer parents. Also, note from Proposition 1 that z falls when ∏ falls which means x rises when ∏ falls.
Investment in child quality rises when parents use more efficient methods of contraception since they are able to regulate fertility at lower cost. Ceteris paribus, the heightened focus on child quality becomes more of a rational imperative with either declines in child mortality or improvements in the contraception technology.
It is instructive to remind ourselves of the standard Beckerian calculus and present a quick contrast with features of the Modern Regime discussed here. Set º = 0 in (12) and solve for a closed-form for n and z:
24ṽ is increasing in ∏: given a ¡, better methods of contraception (lower ∏) lessen the utility loss of fertility reduction and lowerṽ.
Here too n is falling in ¡ as in the Modern Regime, while z is invariant to ¡. Simple differentiation reveals @°¡n ¢ /@v < 0 implying both n and z fall with v if ± < 1 (Assumption 1(c)). Using the just-derived expression for ¡ t n t and (11), we derive
implying that x is independent of ¡. It is also easy to check that @x/@v > 0. The implication is that as incomes rise, investment in child quality rises and fertility falls, the usual Beckerian quality-quantity trade-off. This means transition out of the Malthusian equilibrium in the conventional Becker model is independent of child survival and is purely driven by income growth.
To summarise: in the Modern Regime, households, having adopted deliberate fertility control, respond to a secular increase in child survival by reducing their fertility. However, only one group -households with income higher than a thresholdṽ -see a decline in the number of surviving children and only these families make investments in the quality of their offspring.
The threshold itself falls as survival rises making it more likely for families to join this group over time. In short, inside of a modern equilibrium, a persistent decline in child mortality can, in and of itself, incentivise more and more families to have fewer but higher quality surviving children.
Malthusian Regime
Such a regime is characterised by x t = 0 and n t < ¥. It applies to the eve of the fertility transition when fertility is high, people are limiting births using less-effective traditional methods but still not investing much in the quality of their surviving children. 25 From (15), it follows
So positive quality investment (x > 0) occurs whenever v t°St (v t ), an increasing function of v t , is positive. This happens for v t >v where the income threshold solveŝ
In short, for v t <v, child quality is absent (Malthusian regime) and when v t crossesv, the 25 Long (2006) documents that only half of 6-14 year olds were in school in 1851 and that the average child would stay in school for roughly five years. School fees, ranging from 1-8 pence per week, were partly to blame for low school attendance. Opportunity cost in terms of lost wages from child labor was also important. Long argues that, after the 1870s, compulsory schooling laws 'dramatically changed the cost benefit analysis.' While that is no doubt true, it is our contention that the socio-economic changes described here also had a lot of influence on this cost-benefit analysis. 
We establish Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2. In a Malthusian regime -which obtains when v t <v -household fertility falls with the child survival rate (¡) but rises with full income (v). The number of surviving children rises with the child survival rate (¡) for all income levels satisfying v t <v as long as ø¡¥ < 2 and
In contrast, in the Modern regime discussed above, that is when v t >v, the number of surviving children rises with the child survival rate but only for the sufficiently poor (v < v t <ṽ).
For the rich (v < v t >ṽ) , the number of surviving children falls and investment in their quality rises.
Finally note that since our focus is on late nineteenth century England, on the eve of and during the fertility transition, we rely on Assumption 1(d), ¡ t 2°¡ min ,1 § , to preclude the possibility that households are at their maximal reproductive capacity in the Malthusian equilibrium.
Fertility Transition
A story of the fertility transition is emerging from within the model. Assume households have adopted some deliberate fertility control and contraceptive technology is what it is, the natural kind, and does not change. Now suppose a secular decline in child mortality in underway.
Supposeṽ <v whereṽ is defined in (14) andv in (17) . Starting from v 0 <ṽ <v and n < ¥, as v increases, n rises and so does z, with x at zero. Households respond to a secular increase in child survival by reducing their fertility. When incomes are sufficiently low (v <v), improvements in child mortality raise surviving fertility across the board, even as parents do not invest in their children's' quality. As v increases to abovev, households start substituting child quantity for quality -n starts to fall and x rises. An increase in ¡ lowers both n and z.
Suppose, instead,ṽ >v. Starting from v 0 <v, an increase in v raises n but there is no quality investment. As v increases abovev, quality investment turns positive. In this regime, an increase in v lowers n and raises x. An increase in ¡ also lowers n but, again, raises z. Eventually as v crossesṽ, an increase in v lowers n and raises x (as before) but now an increase in ¡ also lowers z (that is, the drop in n is strong enough). Of course, this is all conditional on the same contraception technology. As ¡ or v becomes large enough, the cost of averting ¥°n births is high enough that some people start switching to modern contraception. As enough people do, there is a further sharp drop in n and increase in x.
A reduction in ∏, the effectiveness of contraception, amplifies the effect of income on fertility and child quality investment. This implies, for example, that historically income had a weak causal effect on the two and, hence, the fertility transition had to wait for the contraception revolution. In modern day developing societies where knowledge and supply of modern contraception is more prevalent, in contrast, income becomes the binding constraint. 26 
Intertemporal Equilibrium
Turn now to the dynamic equilibrium of this economy. We reinstate the i (household) and j (contraception choice) subscripts and allow aggregate productivity A to grow exogenously at rate g . The combined savings of adult-workers gets converted into the future aggregate capital stock, K , which depreciates fully upon use; the interest factor on saving is R t = Ω t . Workers with differing abilities and differing prior parental educational investments supply different amounts of human capital to the market; aggregate human capital sums it all up.
We define a Malthusian and a Modern equilibrium. In a Malthusian (Modern) equilibrium, (17) ,
DEFINITION 1 (Malthusian Equilibrium). Every household i is in a Malthusian
= R s t°1 (v) d z t°1 (v) and H t = R v R " "a dz t (v)d G (") and (1) holds.
DEFINITION 2 (Modern Equilibrium). Every household i is in a Modern equilibrium when v i t > v t wherev t is defined by
t > 0 and given by (15) , and Assumption 1 is satisfied, for a given j . In this case,
and (1) holds.
Steady-state fertility is given by a time-invariant long-run distribution of household-specific fertilities, n i 1 , characterised by (18) in a Malthusian equilibrium and by (12) in a Modern equilibrium. The total fertility rate (TFR) at date t is given by the average fertility rate at that date:
The net fertility rate (NFR) at date t is given by the average surviving fertility at that date:
Our definition of the two equilibria precludes the possibility that some households invest in child quality while others do not. That is, in any equilibrium, all households either have x = 0 or they all have x > 0. In our computational work later, we allow for a "mixed" equilibrium in light of the evidence discussed in footnote 25. 27 Finally, a remark about the use of contraception in the two equilibria. Recall, at the start of Section 2.4, we had suppressed the choice between alternative contraception strategies and assumed everyone was using the traditional technology at the point the model economy takes off. This means our definitions of Malthusian and Modern equilibria presuppose only the traditional technology is in use. Had we allowed contraception choice right from the start, we would have had to specify which technology was in use and in which equilibrium. Indeed, in that environment, it is possible that the traditional technology was in vogue in the Malthusian equilibrium and somewhere along the transition to the Modern equilibrium, families started to switch to the modern technology implying the two technologies could co-exist. We will have more to say on all this in Section 5 below.
Fertility Control and the Diffusion of Technologies
So far we have looked at contraception equilibria under three assumptions: the child survival rate is constant, households have access to only one kind of method and labor productivity is constant. Together these imply the economy eventually gravitates to one of two types of stationary equilibria, high (Malthusian) or low (Modern) fertility.
The salience of these assumptions for the fertility transition will be clearer from Figure 3 . In Figure 3 (a), drawn in (c t , n t ) space after substituting in optimal decisions for quality investment and saving, the income expansion path (IEP) is non-monotonic. The kink in the IEP occurs at a full-income income level where parents are indifferent about whether or not to invest in child quality. Below this income level, higher income increases family size. Above, the effect of income is negative as richer households substitute towards child quality. to implement a given fertility plan, has an effect similar to a higher ¡ on the IEP. The budget lines have been drawn to give an idea how tradeoffs change with income. For a lower value ∏, 27 Another point deserves mention here. Some demographers, for example Szreter (1996) and Garrett et al. (2001) , have argued against the idea of characterising Victorian England as a single block and pointed to the existence of considerable heterogeneity across time, space, and social groups. Our analysis does not rule such heterogeneity out; in fact, we explicitly allow for heterogeneity and are among the few to do so. While the thrust of our analysis is on the experience of England as a whole, it is quite possible that some regions of England or population groups in those regions were in one regime while others, elsewhere, were in another.
the kink occurs at a lower income level (Figure 3(d) ): parents start substituting away from child quantity at a lower income level when it is easier for them to afford the cost of contraception.
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More effective contraception methods (lower ∏) make it cheaper to reduce fertility, easier to direct resources towards child quality. For a given contraception method, a higher survival rate (higher ¡) raises the net marginal benefit of fertility control. The benefit from surviving children does not change but the cost of "excessive" fertility rises since parents may end up with too many survivors. These figures illustrate how the demand for children falls when household full income or child survival improve sufficiently. The negative relationship between fertility and income or child survival becomes more pronounced at higher income levels and more effective methods of contraception ease the ability to achieve fertility targets (Figure 3(d) , dotted line corresponds to a more efficient technology).
The effect of ∏ on fertility decisions will now be incorporated through a switch in contraception methods. Obviously households will switch to a more efficient and costlier method only if perceived returns from it are high. Comparative statics results discussed above point to two
potential causes for such a switch, improvements in income and child survival. Each on its own lowers fertility in the model; those effects on the fertility transition are amplified as households switch to the more efficient method over time. Moreover, our model predicts that richer households will switch first and that they will have smaller families during and after the transition (reverse in pre-transition Malthusian equilibrium). The remainder of this section formalises this choice and its diffusion through the population and over time.
Initially, after child mortality falls or income rises sufficiently, richer households find it advantageous to switch to modern methods of contraception despite high social and informational costs. Even if this decision were to have no social impact, a steady decrease in child mortality alone would make this switch more and more desirable for households down the socioeconomic ladder. Changes in social attitudes accentuate this process in line with the historical evidence. Specifically, the abatement of stigma associated with "unconventional" fertility regulation and the diffusion of knowledge about modern methods of contraception makes it advantageous for poorer households to practice fertility regulation sooner than they would have.
Recall j = 1 is identified as the traditional technology, j = 2 as the modern one. Additionally, we have assumed the modern one is more effective at averting pregnancies, 0 ∑ ∏ 2 < ∏ 1 but the fixed costs of adoption satisfy 0 = AE 1t < AE 2t ¥ AE t initially, before technology 2 is used. Suppose once a household chooses either the traditional or the modern contraception technology, the choice is irreversible. We introduce two types of fixed cost associated with adoption of the modern technology. The overall cost AE t comprises of an information cost AE The second element of the switching cost comes from social interactions. As discussed in Section 2, conscious fertility control in a traditional society is fraught with social repercussions:
deviation from the traditional norm attracts social censure. The more prevalent the use of the modern contraception technology, the less will its adoption be viewed as radical. Suppose each household in the model randomly socialises with another household of the same cohort. The household's social payoff from this interaction is determined by its and its social partner's reproductive choices. Let ≥ be the private return from using modern contraception (Munshi and Myaux, 2006) . It is the intrinsic utility, for example an ego-rent, from using modern contraception, minus other private costs we have not explicitly considered, for example the loss of sexual pleasure from using the withdrawal method or condoms. When both households have adopted the modern technology, neither attracts social censure and each household receives the payoff ≥. Should the social partner be a traditionalist, on the other hand, a modern household receives the net payoff ≥°ª where ª > 0 is the social disapproval it attracts for straying away from "traditional principles". The household's payoff from the traditional method is normalised to zero and traditional households do not attract censure from modern ones.
Household i anticipates a p t proportion of people adopt the modern technology and forms expectations of the utility gain from switching. Switching involves the fixed cost
and makes sense only if
t . This means, given the expected p t and historical p t°1 there is a threshold income level v § t such that individuals above this threshold are better-off switching to the modern technology. The intuition is that the rich enjoy a higher total utility which means they are less affected by increase in marginal disutility due to social opprobrium surrounding their reproductive choices.
In passing, note that higher the (expected) adoption rate of this technology at t and higher the past adoption rate, lower is the threshold income level.
Given the distribution of full income, a perfect foresight period-t equilibrium requires that p t be the fixed point of
We incorporate this social dynamics into the fertility choice model of Sections 3-5 and proceed to study their role in the fertility transition.
Numerical Experiments
In our theory of the Victorian demographic transition, a steep mortality transition and/or income growth due to productivity growth trigger a contraception revolution, which in turn, ushers in the long transition towards near-replacement fertility. There is value in seeing how well it does on the quantitative margin. The goal is not a full-blown calibration exercise, challenging as it is to quantify preference-based social change, but rather to paint a picture of the English transition with broad brushstrokes to see if social change and changing cost of contraception could have made a difference to the transition.
We start by assigning parameter values so that, on certain margins, the model economy resembles key aspects of England before and after its fertility transition. Before the transition, all households are assumed to use traditional methods of contraception; afterward, they all use modern ones that, recall, include the withdrawal method. To better understand the time frame, consider Table 1 . Child mortality (probability of death in the first five years of life) shows a discernible downward trend after 1870 as does the total fertility rate. Consequently, we treat 1870 as the onset of the English mortality and fertility transitions. 28 It is important to note that the pre-transition economy we simulate here is not the Malthusian equilibrium of the model. In the Malthusian equilibrium, household income and fertility rates are positively correlated. English society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries exhibited this positive association but, by the early nineteenth century, the rich were having fewer children (Clark, 2005 (Clark, , 2007 . Moreover, literacy and school enrolment rates were steadily rising during the nineteenth century (Long, 2006 ). In the model, if child mortality does not change, the only way to generate a transition from the Malthusian to Modern regimes is income growth which, in turn, necessitates TFP growth. To resemble the pre-transition economy, we pick pa- 28 Data is for the end-point of a time interval unless noted otherwise. Fertility decline lags mortality declines by about five years, but that is not discernible in our time interval of 25 years. Mortality data comes from mortality. Secondly, in the data, the TFR drops below replacement during the 1930s (effect of World War I) and rises above it soon after World War II (baby boom). Since our model is not tailored to study these temporary shifts, we treat 1945 as the end of the transition; as such, the posttransition TFR is set to replacement, 1.0 in model terms. Table 2 lists the parameter values. We assume the modern contraception technology is highly efficient (∏ 2 = 0) -it can costlessly implement a household's fertility target when everyone uses it -as a simple normalisation. One can be more general by calibrating ∏ 2 to replicate posttransition fertility or some empirical measure of modern contraceptives. But our normalisation has the advantage of mimicking the Beckerian model where contraception costs are implicitly set to zero. Moreover, recall that if ∏ = 0, the expected number of surviving children is independent of ¡. This means, by design, the modern technology alone cannot generate a fertility transition from the child mortality transition.
Parameter Values
Each period of adulthood is taken to be 25 years, childhood to be 15 years. The subjective discount rate Ø follows from the standard quarterly rate of 0.99 compounded over 25 years.
µ, the weight on child quantity has to exceed 0.5 to satisfy Assumption 1(b); it is set to 0.55.
The intensity of warm-glow altruism, ∞, is picked to match post-transition TFR. Specifically, for ∏ = 0, equation (12) simplifies to
where household fertility choice is decreasing in full income, v t . As ¡ ! 1 and v t ! 1 (when 
which is independent of household income. Given other parameter values, ∞ is chosen so that this TFR is at replacement. The pre-transition TFR, on the other hand, is used to pin down the effectiveness of the traditional method, ∏ 1 . Finally the child survival rate is calibrated based on the child mortality rate data in Table 1 : 0.28 prior to the transition, zero after the transition is complete.
The natural fecundity ¥ depends on biological capacity as well as social constructs such as age at marriage and celibacy. Demographers often rely on data for the Hutterites who were perceived to practice little fertility regulation and had 10 children on average. Woods (2000) argues against blindly adopting this number for English natural fecundity, estimating it to be 7.17 instead. This is the value (3.585 per model agent) used in our simulations. Haveman and Wolf (1995) report the opportunity cost of childrearing to be 15% of parental time. Scaled to the 15 years of childhood, this gives ø = 0.09. The resource cost of children, ±, is a scaling parameter and its value is set as per Doepke (2004) . The contraception cost parameters (ª, ≥, AE 0 , AE 1 ) pertain to the transition, that is, 1870-1945. We discuss how they are calibrated later.
The ability distribution is parameterised to be Pareto, specifically,
Normalising mean ability to unity implies " = (#°1)/#. Since reliable data on lifetime income inequality in nineteenth century England is not available, we cannot directly calibrate this dis-persion parameter. In any case our goal is not to explain inequality, only to broadly capture the cross-sectional correlation between income and fertility behaviour. Hence we use #, ae (elasticity of earnings with respect to education) and a (productivity of quality investment) to generate plausible quality investment in children; specifically, at least 60% of children receive education in the pre-transition economy. Lindert (2004) Table 4 .2) calculates an England-specific natural fertility schedule and estimates England's index of family limitation to have gone from 0.013 (1871) to 0.171 29 There are other problems. Besides the small sample size -3281 respondents from different marriage cohorts -reporting bias is to be expected: women would have been reticent to talk about such matters to surveyors or they might not have known much since birth control was largely a male decision before the advent of the pill. The survey does show that contraception rates were correlated with socio-economic status: more women from wealthier occupations were relying on it.
(1891) to 0.842 (1922) to 1.036 (1933) . In the model, there is a close link between the fertility ratio n i t /¥, number of births to married women relative to the total births to those women if they were subject to maximum fertility -same as the variable I g in the Coale-Trussel method -and contraception strategy (∏): a reduction in the latter through the use of modern contraception reduces the former. That is, the proportion of households regulating fertility using the modern method in the model directly translates into an aggregate-level index of family limitation.
The Coale-Trussel evidence, as extended by Woods (2000) , does not face the response problems of the Lewis-Fanning survey. It does have one drawback in that no distinction is made between households who were starting to adopt methods such as coitus interruptus and those that were moving on to appliance-based methods. As we have argued before, to the extent that adoption of coitus interruptus was associated with a better understanding of the process of procreation, its very usage made it modern. Moreover, appliances were rare in the late nineteenth century: some, such as condoms and spermicides, had just started being mass produced but were not widely available for ordinary people, others like diaphragms were popularised later - and 100% in the third period (by 1945). 30 To replicate the mortality and fertility transitions in Table 1 , we "shock" the model by the mortality transition period T (1870-95) onwards and trace the model's prediction about the TFR period T onwards. For this fertility transition we need to calibrate the information cost (AE 0 , AE 1 ) and social cost parameters (≥, ª). We choose these four parameters to best fit four pieces of evidence: the switch towards modern contraception does not start until period T and the adoption rates are 17%, 84.3% and 100% in periods T , T + 1 and T + 2. Since each generation gets a fresh draw from the ability distribution, we choose these parameter values so that mean adoption rates (across 20 rounds of simulation) match their empirical counterparts. That ≥ < 0 in Table 2 indicates the utility loss from modern methods dominates any ego rent from being "modern".
Simulation Results
Start with the upper panel of Figure 4 that reports the proportion of households adopting mod- 
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Fertility Transition
How well does the model's predicted fertility transition match the evidence? This is reported in Figure 5 for the transition period of T + 1 to T + 3 (1870°1945): the solid line is the predicted path of the TFR, the dashed line is the data. The predicted path is quite close to the data though the fit is less than perfect in the third period of the transition when predicted TFR is 25% higher than replacement and 29% higher than actual.
Recall, however, that the calibration matched replacement TFR when everyone switches to modern contraception. A better assessment of the model's predictive power is to compare the simulated TFR during the first two periods of the transition when the calibration targets only contraception adoption rate, not the fertility rates. By this yardstick, the model is promising:
predicted TFR is 6% above actual by the end of T + 1 and 33% above actual by the end of T + 2.
This becomes clearer when we consider counterfactuals below. While the model does well in capturing how the fertility transition unfolded, it is not tailored to explain why English fertility fell below replacement after WWI and then overshot replacement in the decades following WWII (Figure 1 ).
Note also, by design, the model is calibrated to reproduce the observed TFR in period T .
In the data, TFR was steadily falling since the early nineteenth century. While the model does predict a steady decline -solely from income growth -it does not predict as big of a decline as we see in the data. Demographers believe the early nineteenth century decline was driven mainly by the extensive margin which is missing from our model. In addition, the pre-and post-1841 TFR data come from two different sources ( Figure 1 ) and the year for which they overlap (1841) shows a large discrepancy between the two sources. Both data sets point towards some decline in the early nineteenth century. The more pronounced decline, though, occurs after 1870.
On the basis of Figure 4 we conclude that the model provides a good starting point to understand the underlying forces of the English TFR transition.
The role of income growth and contraception
As England became steadily prosperous over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, income growth would have lowered the TFR independently of the mortality transition.
And income and mortality would have reduced fertility even without societal influence on contraception. How much does exogenous productivity growth explain of the simulated transition?
Where does the contraception revolution fit in?
Consider two counterfactuals. To isolate the contribution of income growth, we maintain ¡ at its 1870 value of 0.72 and simulate the time path of the TFR, allowing contraception adoption to change from the Coale-Trussel-Woods estimates. A second counterfactual asks whether the switch to more efficient methods of contraception and their falling cost account for much of the transition. For this we set AE 0 sufficiently high so that no household switches to the modern method during the periods T + 1 to T + 3. These scenarios are presented in Figure 6 . Since the model is not recalibrated in either scenario to match the observed adoption of modern contraception, for comparability we present a modified version of the benchmark case where mortality alone changes exogenously while TFP growth is held to zero from 1870 onwards (that is, whatever income growth occurs comes from the endogenous accumulation of human and physical capital).
The solid grey line in Figure 6 (solid black and dashed grey lines represent the same series as in Figure 5 ) presents this modified benchmark case -evidently the lack of TFP growth does not drastically alter the model's predictive power. The black dotted line represents the path of the TFR when child mortality does not change, while the grey dash-dotted line corresponds to the no-switch scenario. In these two alternative scenarios, even five generations after the fertility transition started, the TFR remains higher than 3. By the third period of the transition, the predicted TFR is more than twice the replacement level and 70% higher than the baseline prediction. By period T + 1, predicted TFR is 14% above actual, by T + 2 it is 88% above actual.
In other words, while income growth has a significant impact on fertility behaviour, its impact on the English fertility transition is less so if the only channel is exogenous productivity growth.
It is not surprising when switching costs are too high (dash-dotted line), the TFR decline is also relatively small compared to what we observe during the historical transition. Here, however, the model predicts a faster TFR transition relative to the income-only scenario, indicating again the importance of the child mortality transition. Fertility remains 74% (38%) higher than replacement (baseline prediction) by T + 3 in this case. By period T + 1, predicted TFR is 10% above actual, by T + 2 it is 71% above actual.
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Net fertility
A central prediction of the model is that a decline in child mortality also lowers the NFR. Turn to predicted and actual net fertility during 1841-1945 in Figure 7 . The dashed line at the bottom represents the NRR2 series reported in Figure 1 . The solid black line represents the predicted path of NFR from the model, computed as ¡n assuming boys and girls faced the same survival rate which is consistent with the evidence (Hinde, 2003, Table 12 .1). Since the model ignores mortality for women during reproductive years, we overestimate net fertility. But the general trend predicted for 1845°1945 closely follows the data. This is not so for the two counterfactual scenarios. For the constant mortality scenario (black dotted line), we have seen from Figure 6 that productivity-based income growth alone does not lower the TFR by much and we see here the predicted NFR barely moves. For the scenario where households do not switch to modern contraception (grey dash-dotted line), the predicted NFR behaves similarly and even shows a slight increase: evidently mortality change and income growth together without the accompanying social change are not enough to substantially lower the TFR to compensate for the higher child survival rate. by Pritchett's (1994) influential study that 90% of cross-country differences in the level of the TFR is explained by differences in women's reported desired fertility alone. In other words, the means to achieve that desired fertility, contraception for instance, plays a minor role. This conclusion has been recently questioned by Lam (2011) A closer look at country-specific evidence uncovers interesting differences. The arrival of female family planning programs caused a public outcry in Bangladesh while in India and Kenya the resistance was less public but no less -fear of side effects, husbands' disapproval or becoming a social pariah. In contrast, not only was there little public outcry in Thailand and Taiwan, women were enthusiastic adopters of modern contraceptives, sometimes traveling far to avail of them (Cleland, 2001 ). Why contraception is so controversial in some countries but not in others is a fascinating question. More to the point, despite advancements in our knowledge of human reproduction, many developing societies still face the internal and external constraints that the Victorians did as they contemplate a shift towards family planning.
As with the reaction to family planning, the evidence on whether or not family planning programs make a difference to completed fertility is mixed. Columbia's well-established program had a minor role in its fertility decline according to Miller (2009) , though it did encourage education and labor force participation among young women. Cochrane and Guilkey (1995) , on the other hand, show that access to family planning methods was a significant cause of Tunisia's fertility decline. Similarly, Joshi and Schultz (2007) find that family planning and maternal-child health programs reduced fertility by about 15% in Bangladesh besides improving longer term maternal and child welfare.
Our modified Becker model provides a common analytical framework to understand fertility change across societies. Whether or not and how much contraception accounts for fertility change may be entirely country-specific. And the proximate determinants of that change may also differ from region to region. Recent work such as Ashraf et al. (2014) find that household bargaining over fertility is important because most contraceptives are perfectly observable only to the wife. Introduction of contraceptives privately targeted to women, without requiring an explicit consent from husbands, can lead to large increase in their usage and reduction in fertility. 32 Unlike Victorian England, women's changing status in today's developing countries may therefore have as much of a role in how much benefits flow from easier access to contraception.
In contrast, using an efficient bargaining model of the household with an endogenous marriage decision and an extensive fertility margin, Baudin et al. (2015) show that contraceptive availability can increase overall fertility if it encourages poor and previously single women to get married because they can now regulate their fertility better. It bears repeating, however, that in our theory contraception by itself cannot do much -factors that lower the demand for children are what initiate the change that then, potentially, benefits from the knowledge and availability of contraception.
Conclusion
In much of Europe, dramatic declines in both mortality and fertility started in the late nineteenth century, a phenomenon that came to be known as the demographic transition. In most instances, mortality decline preceded fertility decline. We argue, the former incentivised the latter. In our theoretical model, as child mortality declines, the unfettered procreation process produces "too many" surviving children. At that point, families start to adopt modern contraception as a way to economise on costly children and free up resources for their upkeep and quality. Richer households are the first to regulate marital fertility and, in doing so, kindle a process of indirect diffusion that gradually lowers fertility across socio-economic groups. In our story, mortality decline is the principal instigator that necessitates a culture of conscious contraception which, in turn, becomes the facilitator of fertility reductions.
But that is only part of the story. The latter part of the nineteenth century is also a period of rapid social, economic and cultural change brought on, in part, by impressive increases in living standards and improvements in nutrition and health. Surely, these too shaped fertility demand and acted as important catalysts of reproductive change. Our theory is not unreceptive to these alternative explanations; it allows for the possibility that rapid income growth, even in the absence of precipitous mortality declines or massive uptake of modern contraception may bring about a fertility transition.
Since our aim has been to single out social influence for fertility choice and its scope in the English transition, this work should not be taken as establishing the salience of mortality over 32 Could, what we label as diffusion have as much to do with women exercising greater control over childbirth?
There is not much direct evidence. We know that, for the most part, couples did not discuss family planning: 'many wives shied away from the issue, leaving responsibility for birth control in the hands of their husbands. . .and asserted that they valued male responsibility for and authority over contraception' (Fisher, 2006, p. 5 France remained less fertile in the nineteenth century than England, the gap is much smaller than previously believed. Complicating matters further is evidence that French infant mortality remained stubbornly high long after fertility had started to decline. McLaren (1983) has argued that during this period, French restriction of fertility was largely due to 'limitations on those who were allowed to marry, postponement of marriage until a couple was in their late twenties, and spacing of births by the married': celibacy, especially among the nobility, was high, brides on average were twenty five, and mothers appealed to traditional taboos against intercourse during nursing so as to space births better. The importance of these extensive-margin factors suggests that our singular focus on the intensive margin of fertility, while appropriate for the time frame we consider for England & Wales, may not be best suited for a study of the French case, a topic we hope to take up in future study. 
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